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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
Nos. 17-1115, 17-1116, 17-1117, 17-1118, 17-1119, 17-1120 and 17-2891
________________
DAVID SHAUN NEAL,
Appellant in 17-1115
v.
ASTA FUNDING, INC.
v.
ROBERT F. COYNE
______________
DAVID SHAUN NEAL
v.
ASTA FUNDING, INC.
v.
ROBERT F. COYNE,
Appellant in 17-1116
______________
ASTA FUNDING, INC.
v.
DAVID SHAUN NEAL;
ROBERT F. COYNE;
NEW WORLD SOLUTIONS, INC.
Robert F. Coyne,
Appellant in 17-1117

Case: 17-1119

Document: 003113082176

Page: 2

Date Filed: 11/08/2018

______________
ASTA FUNDING, INC.
v.
DAVID SHAUN NEAL;
ROBERT F. COYNE;
NEW WORLD SOLUTIONS, INC.
David Shaun Neal,
Appellant in 17-1118 & 17-2891
______________
DAVID SHAUN NEAL,
Appellant in 17-1119
v.
ASTA FUNDING, INC.
______________
ROBERT F. COYNE,
Appellant in 17-1120
v.
ASTA FUNDING, INC.
______________
On Appeal from the District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.N.J. Nos. 2-13-cv-06981, 2-14-cv-02495, 2-14-cv-03550 & 2-14-cv-03932)
Honorable Kevin McNulty, U.S. District Judge
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 5, 2018
Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 8, 2018)
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________________
OPINION*
________________
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from a dispute over the validity of an arbitration award in favor
of Appellee ASTA Funding Inc. (ASTA) based on several fraud-related claims against
Appellants David Shaun Neal and Robert F. Coyne. Appellants challenge the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of ASTA and its denial of their Rule 60(b)
motion. We will affirm the District Court’s orders.
I.

Background
A.

The Parties and Their Dispute

ASTA hired Neal for an IT service position as an independent contractor through
an entity run by Coyne, and did additional business with other entities controlled by Neal
and Coyne. Among these entities were New World Solutions, Inc. (NWS), which entered
into an IT services agreement (ITS Agreement) with ASTA, and Sun Interactive Services,
Inc. (SIS), which Coyne controlled and which ASTA retained on Neal’s recommendation
to provide computer-network monitoring services. ASTA contends that during the course
of its relationship with these entities, Neal and Coyne committed fraud and other
misconduct.
B.

Arbitration and District Court Proceedings

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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After ASTA filed an arbitration action against NWS, Neal, and Coyne pursuant to
an arbitration clause in the ITS Agreement, asserting fraud, breach of contract, and other
claims, Neal and Coyne objected that the claims against them were not arbitrable because
neither of them signed the ITS Agreement and that the question of arbitrability, in any
event, must be resolved by a court, not by the arbitrator. The arbitrator disagreed,
concluding that the issue was his to decide and that both Neal and Coyne were personally
bound by the ITS agreement under a veil-piercing/alter-ego theory, among others.
The arbitrator ultimately issued a liability award of over $3 million against Neal
and Coyne, which they sought to vacate, and which ASTA sought to confirm. The
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court found that the
claims against Neal and Coyne were arbitrable and granted summary judgment to ASTA.
It also denied Appellants’ subsequent motions for reconsideration and for relief from
judgment under Rule 60(b).
II.

Discussion1
Appellants challenge the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, denial of

reconsideration, and denial of relief under Rule 60(b), raising three arguments. None is
persuasive.

1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(D). We review de
novo the District Court’s order granting summary judgment. See, e.g., Chesapeake
Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 753 (3d Cir. 2016). We review
the District Court’s order denying Appellants’ Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion.
See, e.g., Norris v. Brooks, 794 F.3d 401, 403 n.1 (3d Cir. 2015).
4
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First, Appellants contend that the District Court erred by applying federal law,
instead of New Jersey law, in finding that it was proper for the arbitrator to decide
whether Neal and Coyne were individually bound by the ITS Agreement—that is,
whether the claims against them were arbitrable. Under New Jersey law, according to
Appellants, “an arbitrator can never find his own jurisdiction.” Appellants’ Br. 14. The
problem with Appellants’ contention is that the District Court permitted the parties to
take discovery and made its own independent determination that the claims against Neal
and Coyne were arbitrable.2 Thus, even assuming arguendo that the parties did not
delegate the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator, such that the court was required to
“decide that question just as it would decide any other question that the parties did not
submit to arbitration, namely, independently,” First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 943 (1995), here, the District Court did just that. In short, there is no further
remedy to which Appellants would be entitled.3
Second, Appellants contend that three types of damages awarded against them
were not authorized by the ITS Agreement: (1) what Appellants call “indirect” damages,
referring to damages arising from claims concerning fraud related to transactions with the
2

Like the arbitrator, the District Court based its conclusion that the ITS Agreement was
binding on Neal and Coyne—rendering the merits of their dispute arbitrable—on several
independent theories, including a veil-piercing/alter-ego theory.
3
Notably, Appellants do not challenge any of the bases upon which the District Court
determined that the dispute was arbitrable, such as the District Court’s finding that they
were bound to the ITS Agreement under a veil-piercing/alter-ego theory. While they
remark that the District Court erroneously “relied on Encap Golf heavily to determine
that Rule 8 of the AAA rules can be used to compel nonparties to arbitrate,” Appellants’
Br. 19, the District Court did not in fact rely on that case for that proposition, and
Appellants take no issue with the myriad other bases for the District Court’s
determination that the dispute was arbitrable.
5
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SIS entity; (2) punitive damages; and (3) attorney’s fees. Though Appellants fault the
District Court for “ignor[ing]” their arguments on these issues, Appellants’ Br. 21,
Appellants did not raise the same arguments below. As to damages arising from SIS
fraud claims, Appellants only raised arguments that are, at most, tangentially related to
the arguments they now raise on appeal, and they offer no rebuttal to ASTA’s contention
that these are new arguments. As to punitive damages and attorney’s fees, Appellants fail
to cite any place in the record where they raised these particular issues, arguing instead
that they preserved them by challenging the arbitration award generally. That is simply
not the law, and these arguments are therefore waived. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust
Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 261–62 (3d Cir. 2009).
Finally, Appellants posit that the District Court erred by denying their Rule 60(b)
motion. At the outset, the relief sought by Appellants’ Rule 60(b) motion is not entirely
clear. The motion purports to seek relief from the District Court’s own order granting
summary judgment. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent’s Motion
Pursuant to FRCP 60(B), Case No. 2:14-cv-02495, ECF No. 64-1, at 1 (May 1, 2017).
Yet the substance of the motion concerns allegations that the arbitration award—not the
District Court’s judgment—was procured through fraud. Regardless of what relief the
motion sought, we see no basis to conclude that the District Court erred by denying it, as
the motion merely makes unsubstantiated accusations that ASTA lied at various points
during the arbitration and does not present the “extraordinary justifying circumstances”
that could warrant relief under Rule 60(b). Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir.
1991) (citation omitted). And while Appellants’ brief takes issue with several of the
6
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District Court’s particular criticisms of their motion, it ultimately fails to offer any
specific explanation as to how the District Court abused its discretion or to address the
District Court’s central reasons for denying their motion.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary

judgment, denial of reconsideration, and denial of Appellants’ Rule 60(b) motion.
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